Since I've started working on universalism, my reading list has shifted. Which has compelled me to read Ollie Crisp's chapter on Barth vis-à-vis universalism in "All Shall Be Well". And it's just as well that I had already decided not to go the route of comparing Barth to a predetermined standard of universalism. But from the analytic perspective, Crisp does something I find questionable in stating his definition, and I'd like to play with it more.
You see, Crisp begins with the statement that there is a difference that must be respected between "all human beings will be saved" and "all human beings must be saved." Now, on that bare point I can agree, albeit for different reasons—I mean it in deontic terms, and he means it in alethic terms. But he bases this distinction on possible-worlds semantics, such that it appears the difference is between "all actual human beings will be saved" and "all possible human beings will be saved." That is, Crisp makes the question to be answered whether universalism is true, or necessarily true.
Now, I'm not sure this is really the modal question that must be answered with regards to salvation. But the game is then to figure out what the good questions are, and to ask them.
You see, Crisp begins with the statement that there is a difference that must be respected between "all human beings will be saved" and "all human beings must be saved." Now, on that bare point I can agree, albeit for different reasons—I mean it in deontic terms, and he means it in alethic terms. But he bases this distinction on possible-worlds semantics, such that it appears the difference is between "all actual human beings will be saved" and "all possible human beings will be saved." That is, Crisp makes the question to be answered whether universalism is true, or necessarily true.
Now, I'm not sure this is really the modal question that must be answered with regards to salvation. But the game is then to figure out what the good questions are, and to ask them.